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Regrettable
Episode Unfolding Again!!
Roobdoon Forum
roobdoon2000@yahoo.ca
Prime Minister Ali Muhammad Ghedi’s recent
comments on the issue of “One Somalia” principle
(or Somali Weyn concept) raised some eyebrows [1].
The Prime Minister spoke about the relations between the Transitional
Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia and the neighbouring countries
of Kenya and Ethiopia, pointing out that there is no territorial
(and people) dispute between them. Ghedi’s comments
underlined that Somalia and its neighbours together, as IGAD
members, could form the starting point for securing stability
in the region and building an economic and political cooperation.
This, in turn, can guarantee the basis for a new socio-political
framework of permanent well-being of all Somalis in the Horn
of Africa.
This “optimistic outreach” has been interpreted
differently, especially Somalis in the Diaspora. However,
the majority of the Somalis in the Diaspora insist that Ghedi
chose to shorten his journey to political ascendancy; and
more importantly, the new TFG which also opted to mute Somali
Weyn cause will surely find itself navigating in unmarked,
maybe dangerous waters, like the elected 1967 civil government.
To realize to the extent of the problem, many Somalis in the
Diaspora have never, to begin with, accepted the peace-brokered
efforts of Ethiopia and Kenya as genuine; they believe that
it was a careful orchestrated scheme set up to lead Somalis
to relax its Somali Weyn vigilance. In gathering places, you
see Somalis fiercely debating whether any peace brokered by
Somali neighbours could be real!
Furthermore, some political analysts have recently drawn
to the conclusion that the Somali nation-State, as it was
before the civil wars, is hardly to re-emerge. Yet, as an
ethnic group, Somalis do play a vital role in the stability
and the development of the region. This paradox is seemingly
but exceptionally contradictory. Somali nomads were roaming
in the Somali Peninsula for centuries, mostly without a Central
Authority. Despite the many instances of clan-warfare, dismemberment,
and anarchy, Somalis have always maintained the capabilities
to deflect any permanent domination/occupation. There is always
a common Somali denominator in the minds of the nomads, even
though it does not manifest in their dealings of clan-politics.
Therefore, foreign observers often find difficult to read
nomads’ clan-politics; and therefore reach an elusive
conclusion which frequently manifest itself in futile. This
short paper will therefore attempt to reflect on the history
of foreign complicity and manipulation in making “One
Somalia” principle somehow redeemable.
Since 1991, Somali neighbours (particularly, Ethiopia and
Kenya) have launched a series of political maneuvers to realize
their determination of convincing the general Somali populace
to swallow the unassailable Somali Weyn identity and unification.
Taking advantage of the current Somali debacle, our neighbours
have regularly intimidated Somali clan-elders, faction leaders/warlords,
and regional leaders to first and foremost abandon any attempts
that unify the Somalis and thus regenerate challenges against
the existence artificial boundaries inherited from the European
colonial administrations in the region. Thus, whenever a Somali
peace reconciliation conference is held in Ethiopia or Kenya,
the host takes a more drastic, but obvious covert actions
to indicate to the Somalis that its toleration of any tendencies
of Somali Weyn is wearing thin. However, failure of such political
maneuvers to generate the desired intimidating effect will
surely force the neighbouring countries to resort to either
more reckless military attacks on Somalia or galvanize the
West to “contain” Somalia for them. To measure
Kenya and Ethiopia’s success or failure in resolving
the territorial disputes, one has to look back the 1960s conflicts
in the region.
The 1960s Scenario
At the inception of the Somali Republic in July 1st 1960,
Somali leaders openly put forth their ambitions to rehabilitate
the sovereignty of all Somalis in the Horn of Africa, including
the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and the Northern Frontier District/Province
of Kenya. This political line has immediately strained the
relations between the new born Somali Republic and Ethiopia.
For some time, the two sides accused each other for territorial
violation and armed aggression on its borders. These border
clashes led Somalia to seek military aid from the former U.S.S.R.
On an interview conducted in English at his office in November
30, 1963, the Prime Minister of Somalia, Abdirashid
Ali Shermarke, declared that “military aid
promised by the Soviet Union is being accepted only because
Somalia must defend itself from the Ethiopian attacks and
pillaging of the Somali peoples.” Premier Shermarke
also explained Somalia’s critical dilemma from an economic
stand point in which he underlined that “ Somalia’s
treasury could not much longer cope with the problem of feeding
and sheltering thousands of Somali refugees”, escaping
from the mayhem caused by the Ethiopian soldiers in the Ogaden
region [2].
Extensive Political and media provocations between the two
sides have instigated a sudden but sporadic bloody border
clashes, as early as January of 1964. The Somali Foreign Minister,
Abdullahi Isse Mohamud had submitted an official
protest letter to the Ethiopian Ambassador in Mogadishu, Ahadu
Sabura. By March of that year, the conflict widened
into a full-scale war, both arms confronting at border between
Somalia and Ethiopia. In these border clashes, Ethiopian military
planes destroyed numerous police posts and civilian houses
inside Somalia. Ethiopian military campaigns caused indiscriminate
killings of civilians and wounding many others. Ethiopian
border soldiers raided livestock belonging to Somali nomads
and opend fire when the nomads resisted.
Moreover, Ethiopia and Kenya agreed to form a mutual defense
pact that they referred as “a joint measures of dealing
with the Somali disturbances” – a move which Somalis
considered “as contrary to the spirit of the OAU”
[3]. The few
reconciliation efforts, in regional level, that have been
arranged also failed to produce any peace settlements. At
the Organization for African Union (OAU) Summit Conference
in Cairo (July 23, 1964), African leaders have attempted
to reach a ‘Resolution’ that satisfies on both
sides; however, it failed to do so. Somali News in Mogadishu
published that “Somalia will not be bound by the OAU
ruling [which states] that its member-States’ present
frontier are to be maintained”, in which the Somali
National Assembly had passed a motion against OAU ruling,
in October of 1964. That is, the Somali government officially
rejected the outcome of the Cairo Conference, regarding on
frontier issues.
In a net assessment of the outcome of the Somali-Ethiopian
border skirmishes is that Super Power interventions in the
region have officially began. Somali sought the military and
technical aid of the Soviets; while the Ethiopian regime involved
actively in convincing, as it seems, the American Administration
to tackle Somali Weyn cause.
In September 1974, a conference held in Washington, sponsored
by the Center for the National Security Studies was presented
proceedings and papers on the subject of “The CIA and
Covert Action”. Roger Morris and Richard Mauzy
presented a comprehensive piece of research which
is, as they state, based on both written sources and many
oral conversations that they had with US decision-makers and
foreign policy officials who supplied them many of their research
discourse [4].
The title of their research paper is: Following the Scenario:
Reflection on Five Case Histories in the Mode and Aftermath
of CIA Intervention.
Morris and Mauzy unveil that the U. S. Central Intelligence
Agency had been clandestinely funneling mainly a financial
support to the political actors in Somalia since mid 1960s,
in an effort to ward off Somali Weyn tendencies inside top
brass leadership. In 1967 election campaigns, for example,
the CIA provided thousands of dollars to assist in the election
of the Prime late Prime Minister Mohamed Haji Ibrahim
Egal and some of his fellow Somali Youth League (SYL)
members. Here is a selection from Morris and Mauzy’s
case history of CIA ‘campaign of financing’ in
the 1967 Somali elections:
An impoverished
land of less than three million along the northeastern coast
of Africa where the Indian Ocean meets the Gulf of Aden, Somalia
was of concern to Washington for a number of reasons. Irredentist
claims threatened border warfare with both Kenya and Ethiopia,
the latter a long-time U.S. client state under Haile Selassie
and the site of a major intelligence base. Somalia was also
an early recipient of Soviet aid in Africa, and its coastline
held potentially strategic ports for any future rivalry in
the Persian Gulf or Indian Ocean, an interest shared by France
and Britain. At that, however, the country was apparently
not an urgent concern in U.S. diplomacy. When Somalia predictably
rejected a 1963 American offer of "defensive" arms,
conditioned on the exclusion of all other supplies, the State
Department leaked its "displeasure" but seemingly
did no more.
Over the next four
years, 1963-1967, official U.S.-Somali relations were distant
and U.S. aid next to nothing while Somali leaders visited
the Soviet bloc, Somali newspapers published anti-American
forgeries planted by Soviet intelligence, and the country
fought a brief but bloody border war with Ethiopia. Then suddenly,
early in 1967, history took a turn for the better. President
Abd-i-Rashid Shermarke was elected for a six-year term as
President in June and in July appointed as Premier Muhammad
Egal, American-educated and avowedly pro-Western. By fall,
U.S. aid was resumed in amounts twice the previous total since
independence, and Somalia had concluded a border agreement
with Ethiopia [see the footnote to read the 1967-68 Somali
Border Agreements with Ethiopia and Kenya] [5].
In 1968 Egal visited the United States, following a visit
to Somalia by Vice President Humphrey, and was hailed by President
Johnson as "enormously constructive in a troubled area
of Africa." What the two leaders did not discuss, say
official sources, was how "constructive" the CIA
had been for Mr. Egal, whose rise, to power was reportedly
facilitated by thousands of dollars in covert support to Egal
and other pro-Western elements in the ruling Somali Youth
League party prior to the 1967 Presidential election.
In retrospect, this
clandestine bankrolling in Somalia seems very modest by CIA
standards, only a tiny fraction of what the Agency has spent
in a month in Southeast Asia or even what it spent in the
Congo in the early sixties. And its immediate benefits-in
rising U.S. influence, in the detente with a grateful Ethiopia-no
doubt seemed real enough at the time. In any event, several
sources say the subsidies were discontinued in 1968. But the
withdrawal was to be perhaps too late. On October 15, 1969,
while Egal was again visiting the United States, President
Shermarke was assassinated. A week later the Army seized power,
dissolving the National Assembly and Constitution and arresting
the entire Cabinet, including Egal. Among the charges against
Egal would be corruption of the electoral process and complicity
with foreign intelligence services. Ironically, the bizarre
CIA political contributions before 1967 may have been a decisive
factor in the eventual fall of the Agency's candidate [6].
Reflecting
the unwise decisions made by the CIA about its covert political
interventions and subsidies, Premier Egal’s government
lasted less than three years. In October 21st 1969, a military
led coup d'état replaced the civilian government, detaining
and charging (as mentioned above) the civilian Prime Minister
of ‘complicity with foreign intelligence’. The
military men have actually spoiled the CIA agenda –
whether this was also instance of complicity of another foreign
factor/s or genuine local revolutionary respond that vehemently
opposed to the unfolding scenarios of border agreements, is
debatable. However, one thing was sure: the military takeover
was a bloodless transition that succeeded to frustrate the
pro-American elements in the country and ended the American
subsidiary civilian government. Italian writer, Luigi Pestalozza,
who observed and recorded the early unfolding events of the
Somali military Revolution states that “No tears were
shed for the men who thus left the stage forever, disappearing
from the [political] history of Somalia
[7].”
The military regime soon declared to the commitments of “Greater
Somali” doctrine, stressing that colonialism comes in
all shades: White and Black – i.e. there are both White
(European) and Black (referring to Ethiopians) colonizers.
Despite the ousted government’s ‘marathon’
Border Agreements, the revolutionary regime simply regarded
all border treaties as null and void; and thus an atmosphere
of “no war and no peace” was created in the region.
The Somali military leadership also declared without hesitation
that they will employ the use of force, as an ultimate answer,
to unite Somalis in the region and resolve the territorial
dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia. The leader of the Somali
Revolution, Mohamad Siyad Barre, expressed
his dissatisfaction with the OAU and the UN efforts to solve
the prolonged Somali dilemma; and subsequently, he prepared
the Somali nation to go to war.
Therefore, the lessons to be learned from the 1960s’
foreign intervention in the politics of the Somali State have
been disastrous. So far, all the previous means utilized by
foreign forces/agencies to intervene in Somali politics –
including misinformation, manipulation, and conspiracy against
the Somali nation-State – produced bad harvests or may
I say remained in the memories of few Somali individuals.
Premier Ghedi’s Remarks: Flippant or Optimistic
Outreach
Unless we overturn Premier Ghedi’s remarks (on Somali
Weyn issue) and read it in the context of ‘optimistic
outreach’, mainly catered to the ‘spirit’
of IGAD propositions and efforts of regional stability and
cooperation, the 1960s futile strategies of “I jiid
aan ku jiidee” scenario inside the Somali parliament
seems unfolding again. For example, in mid 1964, an uproar
and misunderstanding created a heated debate in the parliament,
splitting the Somali National Assembly when the then Prime
Minister, Abdirizak Haji Hussein put forth
a sensitive program on the table, regarding the issue of Somali
Weyn. Regrettably, the program was named: “The Destiny
of the Somalis Living in Ethiopian Territory and NFD.”
The importance and the sensitivity of the Somali Weyn feelings,
inside the walls of the Somali Parliament, have been recorded
expressively by Jeanne Contini in this manner:
All opposition speakers
chose to interpret the reference to “in Ethiopian territory,
etc.” as government acknowledgment of Ethiopian and
Kenyan Sovereignty over Somali in-habited areas, thus concluding
that the government had no intention of liberating the territories
under foreign rule. The Prime Minister explained that there
had been a misprint in the first published version of the
program, and that the reference was later corrected to read
“The Destiny of Somali Territories under Ethiopian and
Kenyan Domination.” In countering the attack, he also
called the attention to the fact that a Minister (without
portfolio) for Somali Affairs had been included in the Cabinet
for the first time, and that his function was expressly to
deal with the problems of “Greater Somalia.” (One
deputy thereupon criticized the title of the new Minister
as having been inspired by foreigners, because it should have
been “Minister for the Somali Affairs under Foreign
Rule”) [8].
Bearing in mind the history of Somali Weyn controversy, conventional
wisdom also informs us that due to the current tragic situation
the TFG would not dare now to risk losing the support of Ethiopia
and Kenya for the sake of Somali Weyn Principle. In addition,
the clan-infested Somalis of today might also be reluctant
to deal now any border disputes with their neighbours. Although
we could not be certain about how Ethiopia and Kenya may respond
to the re-emergence of Somali Weyn tendencies in Somalia,
a military option will be their least option. Our neighbours
are aware of the fact that Somali clannism presented them
a valuable gift – i.e. an opportunity for covert operation.
An open conflict between Clan-loyalty and State-loyalty is
now fighting on the common grounds of Somali once again. It
is therefore very difficult to tell a Somali from a Kenyan
or Ethiopian; in fact, all sides are represented by Somali
clans. A token subsidy can provide opportunities for recruiting
clan-oriented Somalis as foreign agents.
Publicly, Prime Minister Ghedi should
not however risk appearing to be too soft on “One Somalia”
Principle because, as he is aware of it, recruiting Somali
nomads by foreigners will not last that long. After all, nomad-loyalty
is like a moving cloud which often betrays, and often shows
us the nakedness of the true blue-sky. Thus, he should rather
be remembered for achieving a “truce’ and understanding
that concerns on our neighbours, without creating a political
blunder. Yet, he has also to make sense to attract Somalis
in order to look credible and trustworthy.
In doing so, the Prime Minister freezes his local enemies
without a battle; he alienates them without insulting them
and crushes their Isbaaro fiefdoms without military operations.
To succeed in this strategy, the Premier has to convince all
sides of the equation that he is prepared to act as a goodwill
politician who is willing to avoid flippant remarks, irrespective
of the consequences. In this way, the Prime Minister can reason
his intent to tone down his declamatory speeches on the issue
of Somali Weyn, unlike the forthright declamation
speeches delivered by his predecessors. Finally, he should
remind the Somali populace to espouse and commit their efforts
to rebuild their shattered Somali Republic; and only then,
when the Republic earns the rightful international recognition
for the status of “recuperated” Somalia, can the
issue of border talks resume on an equal footing.
A. S. Faamo
Roobdoon Forum
Toronto, Canada
roobdoon2000@yahoo.ca
References:
[1] A
telephone- interview with the BBC World Service, Somali Section,
on November 11, 2005.
[2] An
interview conducted at the Premier’s Office in November
30th 1963. Sources from The New York Times and Hindustan Times,
New Delhi.
[3] Africa Confidential,
No. 1, (January 10, 1964), p. 7.
[4] Rogers Morris
and Richard Mauzy, “Following the Scenarios: Reflections
on Five Case Histories in the Mode and Aftermath of CIA Intervention”,
in The CIA File (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1976), edited
by Robert L. Borosage and John Marks, p. 28.
[5] On the first
week of September, 1968, the Ethiopian Herald covered Premier
Egal’s four-day official visit to Addis Ababa. Mr. Egal
signed a joint communiqué with Ethiopia that aimed
to create a good neighbourly relation between the two countries.
Immediately after he signed the communiqué with his
counterpart, Mr. Akilu Habtewold, Ethiopian Herald published
Egal’s comments about the talks between the two sides,
stating that he has said, “It is going to be the beginning
of a new era in the Ethiopian-Somali relation.” Also,
Roobdoon Forum has posted the Somali Border Agreements on
the following websites:
http://www.biyokulule.com/somali%20border.htm
http://www.dhahar.com/articles/roobdoon101105.html
http://www.laasqoray.net/article.php?articleid=565
http://www.radiosanaag.com/roob.htm
[6] Rogers Morris and Richard Mauzy,
“Following the Scenarios: Reflections on Five Case Histories
in the Mode and Aftermath of CIA Intervention”, in The
CIA File (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1976), edited by
Robert L. Borosage and John Marks, p. 3-38.
[7] Luigi Pestalozzi,
The Somalian Revolution, translated from Italian by Peter
Glendening (Paris: Editions Afrique Asie Amerique Latine,
1974), p. 40.
[8] Jeanne Contini,
“The Somali Republic: Politics with a Difference,”
Africa Report, Vol. 9. No. 10 (November, 1964), p. 6.
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